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The UCITS framework has been one of the most regulatory successful stories in the investment fund world and Today the UCITS funds are associated with safety, good governance, and investor protection. The latest UCITS reformulation has been done in 2016, in a moment of political and economical stability. What was considered strong enough 9 years ago, at the time of approval of UCITS V does not always work today, and surely didn't work during COVID period. UCITS VI is not a revolution, but it is a consequences of the challenges faced over the pandemic as well as a step that brings the UCITS framework closer to the realities of the current fund industry, especially after the market shocks of recent years.
To understand why the UCITS VI is necessary, we need to look back at UCITS V. When UCITS V entered into force in 2016, it focused on three areas: the role of the depositary, remuneration rules, and sanctions. These were important topics and they helped strengthen the structural foundation of the UCITS regime, but they did not deal with the operational side of fund management. They did not address liquidity in any meaningful way, even though liquidity is the core risk of an open-ended fund. They did not address the growing complexity of delegation models. And they did not address the fact that national regulators were applying UCITS rules differently, often leading to gaps and inconsistencies. For a few years this did not seem like a major issue, but then the market changed.
Between 2020 and 2022, several episodes reminded regulators that the liquidity risk in open-ended funds deserves more attention. During the COVID-19 shock, some funds were forced to suspend redemptions. What became very clear is that many investment funds were not prepared. They had redemption policies written on paper, but when the crisis arrived, the policies did not help. Tools existed, but they were not pre-selected, not operational, not tested, and not understood by investors. Supervisors realized that relying on generic stress tests and annual statements was not enough. They wanted funds to plan in advance for situations where liquidity suddenly disappears.
This is where UCITS VI comes in. One of the central ideas of UCITS VI is that liquidity management needs to be real, not theoretical. Funds will have to decide in advance which liquidity tools they will use if market conditions deteriorate. They will have to explain how these tools work, why they were chosen, and how they will be activated. This forces management companies to think seriously about the structure of their portfolios, the liquidity of their assets, and the behavior of their investors. It also changes the role of the board, because approving a liquidity framework becomes a decision with clear operational consequences. UCITS VI basically pushes funds to stop improvising during crises and to start preparing for them. UCITS VI will require management companies to pre-define their activation mechanisms, escalation procedures and interaction with the fund’s valuation and dealing arrangements. Liquidity risk management will need to be supported by quantitative liquidity risk indicators, portfolio-level liquidity bucketing and periodic stress-testing that reflects a range of redemption profiles, liquidation horizons, bid-ask spreads, market depth assumptions and cross-asset correlations under stressed conditions. UCITS VI also reinforces governance expectations by imposing explicit board accountability for the operational viability of LMTs, including their integration into constitutional documents and investor disclosures, and by requiring ongoing coordination with depositaries, transfer agents and fund administrators to ensure execution without market disruption.
